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//proc/self/root/usr/share/doc/portmap-4.0/README
@(#) README 1.6 96/05/31 15:52:57 This is the README file for the 4th enhanced portmapper release. Description ----------- This README describes a replacement portmapper that prevents theft of NIS (YP), NFS, and other sensitive information via the portmapper. As an option, the program supports access control in the style of the tcp wrapper (log_tcp) package. Like all portmappers, this one is intended to be started at boot time. Daemons that offer RPC services tell the portmapper on what port they listen. Unlike the well-known services registered with the inetd, RPC network port numbers may change each time the system is booted. Whenever a client wants to use an RPC service it is supposed to first ask the portmapper on what port the corresponding daemon is listening. The rpcinfo command can tell you what RPC services your system offers. As described in the features section below, the replacement portmapper can prevent undesirable client-server interactions. In some cases, better or equivalent alternatives are available: The SunOS portmap that is provided with patch id 100482-02 should close the same security holes. In addition, it provides an YPSERV daemon with its own access control list. This is better than just portmapper access control. The "securelib" shared library (eecs.nwu.edu:/pub/securelib.tar) implements access control for all kinds of (RPC) services, not just the portmapper. However, vendors still ship portmap implementations that allow anyone to read or modify its tables and that will happily forward any request so that it appears to come from the local system. Features -------- - optional: host access control. The local host is always considered authorized. Access control requires the libwrap.a library that comes with recent tcp wrapper (log_tcp) implementations. - requests to change the portmap tables are accepted only when they come from the local system. - optional: requests to (un)register services that listen on privileged ports (port < 1024) are accepted only when the requests themselves come from a privileged port. This feature is optional because of older RPC implementations. - requests that are forwarded by the portmapper will be forwarded through an unprivileged port. - the portmapper refuses to forward requests to rpc daemons that do (or should) verify the origin of each request: when the portmapper forwards a request it appears to come from the local machine. At present, the portmapper refuses to forward all RPC calls to itself, and most RPC calls to the NFS mountd/nfsd daemons, and to the NIS daemons. Restrictions ------------ Limiting access to the portmapper does not protect you from direct attacks on the rpc daemons; the main task of portmap is to maintain a table of available RPC services and of the network ports that they are listening on. The securelib can be used to protect individual RPC daemons, and the latest SunOS portmap+NIS fix already protects the NIS daemons and implements limited forwarding. On the other hand, even though a portmapper with access control only makes an attack more difficult, it still provides an excellent early warning system. Origin and portability ---------------------- The sources in this distribution are derived from code on the second BSD networking tape, which was derived from Sun's RPCSRC 4.0 code, and from Sun's TIRPC (transport-independent rpc) distribution. The code compiles fine with SunOS 4.1.x, Ultrix 4.x, HP-UX 9.x, AIX 3.x and AIX 4.x, and Digital UNIX (OSF/1). See the notes in the Makefile. Solaris 2.x (and other true System V.4 clones) use a different program called rpcbind. I have written a replacement for that program, too. The primary achive is ftp.win.tue.nl:/pub/security/rpcbind_xx.tar.Z. Installation ------------ (1) Follow the instructions in the Makefile, then build the portmap and auxiliary executables. (2) Before killing the present portmap process, save the present portmapper tables using the command: ./pmap_dump >table If you kill the portmap process without saving its tables you will have to reboot the machine. Note: the information in the portmap tables is dynamic: For example, it will be different after each reboot. On a Sun, it even changes each time a windowing system is started that uses the selection service. (3) Kill the running portmap process and start the new portmap program. Then (still as root) initialize the portmap tables with: ./pmap_set <table (4) If you get error messages of the form: "not registered: xxxx", disable the CHECK_PORT feature in the Makefile, remove pmap_check.o and rebuild the portmap program. Then proceed with step 3. If the portmapper complains that it cannot find all machine interfaces you will have to rebuild it with -DHAS_SA_LEN set (see Makefile). In order to revert to the original portmap daemon, kill off the running one, restart the original portmapper and reload its tables using the "pmap_set" command as shown above. Access control: --------------- By default, host access control is enabled. However, the host that runs the portmapper is always considered authorized. The host access control tables are never consulted with requests from the local system itself; they are always consulted with requests from other hosts. In order to avoid deadlocks, the portmap program does not attempt to look up the remote host name or user name, nor will it try to match NIS netgroups. The upshot of all this is that only network number patterns will work for portmap access control. Sample entries for the host access-control files are: /etc/hosts.allow: portmap: your.sub.net.number/your.sub.net.mask portmap: 255.255.255.255 0.0.0.0 /etc/hosts.deny portmap: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | mail root) & The syntax of the access-control files is described in the hosts_access.5 manual page that comes with the tcp wrapper (log_tcp) sources. The safe_finger command comes with later wrapper releases. The first line in the hosts.allow file permits access from all systems within your own subnet. Some rpc services rely on broadcasts and will contact your portmapper anyway; and once an intruder has access to your local network segment you're already in deep trouble. The second line in the hosts.allow file may be needed if there are any PC-NFS systems on your network segment. For security reasons, the portmap process drops root privilegs after initialization. The access control files should therefore be readable for group or world. Testing: -------- Normally, only rejected requests will be reported via the syslog daemon. Logging is done in a child process, in order to avoid possible deadlock in case the logging code needs assistance from the portmapper. By default, the portmapper will be utterly silent. In fact, the portmap daemon is not consulted that often. Sending a SIGINT signal to the portmap process will enable the logging of all requests. Another way to enable verbose logging is to start the daemon with the "-v" option. See above, steps (2) and later, on how to stop and restart the portmapper without having to reboot. Warning: with some HP-UX and AIX versions, when verbose logging is on, the system fills up with zombie processes. This can be fixed by compiling with -DIGNORE_SIGCHLD (see instructions in the Makefile). With verbose logging turned on, requests such as "ypcat" or "rpcinfo -p" should show up with log file entries such as: MMM dd hh:mm:ss hostname portmap[pid]: connect from x.x.x.x to getport(ypserv) MMM dd hh:mm:ss hostname portmap[pid]: connect from y.y.y.y to dump() Send SIGINT to the portmapper to turn the verbose logging off. Acknowledgements ---------------- Casper H.S. Dik (casper@fwi.uva.nl) provided valuable information on RPC security and tested an intermediate version of the portmapper with SunOS 4.1.2. Lyford D. Rich (rich@ece.nps.navy.mil) was helpful with porting the daemon to Ultrix 3.x. Lionel Cons (cons@dxcern.cern.ch) solved the HP-UX problem. Fabrice Gonton (Fabrice.Gonton@sagem.fr) figured out how to make the program work on AIX 4.1, and Michael Matthews took care of the DEC Alpha platform. Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl) Mathematics and Computing Science Eindhoven University of Technology The Netherlands